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Interactions
Abstract
Research summary: This article proposes an approach for modeling competitive interactions that incorporates
the costs to firms of changing strategy. The costs associated with strategy modifications, which we term
“repositioning costs,” are particularly relevant to competitive interactions involving major changes to business
strategies. Repositioning costs can critically affect competitive dynamics and, consequently, the implications
of strategic interaction for strategic choice. While the literature broadly recognizes the importance of such
costs, game-theoretic treatments of major strategic change, with very limited exceptions, have not addressed
them meaningfully. We advocate greater recognition of repositioning costs and illustrate with two simple
models how repositioning costs may facilitate differentiation and affect the value of a firm's capability to
reduce repositioning costs through investments in flexibility.
Managerial summary: This article illustrates how the decision to make a strategic change is affected by both
the cost to the firm of making the various strategy modifications, as well as the cost to its rivals of changing
their strategies in response. These “repositioning costs” are important because they shape the responses each
competitor would likely make to a move by the other competitor, and should be anticipated when considering
an initial change to one's own strategy. The paper shows how repositioning costs can be used strategically to
facilitate differentiation, and to assess the value of potential investments in flexibility.
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Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods
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Abstract 
This paper proposes an approach for modeling strategic interactions that incorporates the costs to 
firms of changing their strategies. The costs associated with strategy modifications, which we 
term “repositioning costs,” constitute a defining feature of strategic choice which is particularly 
relevant to interactions involving grand strategies. Repositioning costs can critically affect 
competitive dynamics by making strategies “sticky” and, consequently, the implications of 
strategic interaction for strategic choice. And yet, while the organization and strategy literatures 
broadly recognize the importance of repositioning costs, game-theoretic treatments at the grand 
strategy level with very limited exceptions have not focused on them.  In this paper we argue for 
greater recognition of repositioning costs, provide a repositioning cost typology, and demonstrate 
the fertility of this approach with a simple model of inter-firm competitive interaction in which 
repositioning costs increase with the length of time that a firm has been executing its current 
strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
Strategic change is daunting. To go “all in” requires a commitment to developing new 
capabilities and integrating those capabilities across the activity system of the firm, while 
abandoning existing systems that either do not support or actively undermine the strategic 
change. The costs involved with such change—what we call repositioning costs—can be 
analyzed from the viewpoint of the focal firm itself, but a full assessment of the benefits of 
strategic change requires, among other things, assessing future moves and countermoves of the 
focal firm and its rivals. Understanding these strategic dynamics, especially when assessing 
grand strategy, requires consideration of repositioning costs. This paper constitutes an initial 
attempt to both elevate and formalize the role of repositioning costs within analyses of grand 
strategy. 
The approach proposed incorporates repositioning costs into game theoretic models of 
grand strategy. The repositioning costs we contemplate include those associated with strategic 
changes to a firm’s market position or its configuration. Such costs reflect a change to a firm’s 
activity system (Porter, 1996) and reflect myriad factors including the similarity between the old 
and new activity systems, the length of time during which the previous activity system was 
employed, and the difference in the resources needed to support each position. Repositioning 
costs are, therefore, path dependent.2 
Our focus on repositioning costs reflects Pankaj Ghemawat’s perspective on commitment 
as strategy (Ghemawat, 1991). He persuasively argues that a strategic choice is one that involves 
commitment.  Because strategic choices necessarily entail revising prior commitments, all such 
choices involve repositioning costs. As such, repositioning costs are critical factors shaping 
strategic interaction at the grand strategy level. 
Incorporating repositioning costs into conventional game-theoretic models requires 
explicit assumptions regarding costs associated with shifting from one activity system to another. 
A voluminous literature exists, primarily in economics, that explores the varied mechanisms 
through which commitment operates and includes topics such as entry, pricing, and capacity 
expansions.  While employing the same methodology as this research, our approach differs 
owing to its emphasis on exploring general repositioning cost structures associated with changes 
in higher-level or “grand strategy” rather than on specific costs that firms incur as part of 
commitments made below the level of grand strategy.  
The next section explains why repositioning costs are central to understanding strategy 
dynamics and argues that such costs generally should be included in models addressing strategic 
change. We also situate our idea in the strategy, organization, and economics literatures. Section 
3 proposes a typology of the repositioning costs. Section 4 presents a simple example that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ghemawat (1991) notes that many define strategy as a broad pattern of behavior that persists over time.  
Activity systems have the characteristic of generating such patterns. 
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illustrates how repositioning costs can be incorporated in a game-theoretic model of strategic 
dynamics and explains the value of including those costs. Section 5 discusses the endogeneity of 
repositioning costs and the value of game-theoretic models for developing strategic advice. 
Section 6 concludes.  
2.  Repositioning costs and commitment in various literatures 
To position our ideas within the broader literature, we first clarify the context at issue and 
define key terms. Our focus is on how a firm’s strategy may change over time in anticipation of 
and in response to competitors’ strategy choices. We designate a firm’s current configuration of 
resources and activities as its “activity system” and we reserve the use of the term “grand 
strategy” to designate overall plans that allow for major changes in activity systems consistent 
with the idea of strategic change. “Repositioning costs” refers to the costs associated with 
changes to the existing activity system or changes from one activity system to another. These 
definitions reflect our focus on strategy-level questions and are also consistent with the use of the 
term “strategy” in game theory wherein a strategy is a plan of action for the entire game. The 
repositioning cost approach is, of course, also applicable to tactical actions. But when tactics are 
involved the cost of changing actions will not usually be first order. 
Our starting point is Pankaj Ghemawat’s (1991) theory of commitment as the essential 
element in identifying strategic choices. We briefly review this theory and then discuss how the 
literature has treated the two main elements—repositioning costs and inter-firm interaction—
around which our approach is built.3  
Ghemawat identifies commitment as the distinguishing feature of strategic choices. He 
argues that committed choice creates the persistent pattern of action typically characterized as 
strategy. Top-level strategists are advised to focus their attention on irreversible choices since 
those decisions will guide and constrain a firm’s future path. While more easily reversed choices 
(e.g., pricing in most cases) may be important, they are not, in this view, strategic.  Because the 
degree and importance of commitment varies along a continuum, choices will vary in strategic 
importance. Along these lines, one example of strategic choice Ghemawat offers involves 
product choices by airframe manufacturers. These manufacturers arguably bet their company on 
each major product because of the lengthy product development cycle, commitment of resources, 
and (hopefully) long lifetime of the product. In contrast, for companies with a large product 
portfolio and modest product launch and exit costs, product choice may be of less strategic 
importance. 
Not only does Ghemawat’s theory treat repositioning costs as an essential element in 
assessing strategy dynamics, it also helps a strategist identify which choices to assess most 
closely. In tactical situations, the choice set is relatively straightforward especially when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Van den Steen (2013) for an alternative view of strategy which argues that irreversibility does not 
necessarily make a decision more strategic. 
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contrasted with situations involving grand strategy. In such tactical settings and in those 
involving true grand strategy, the commitment criterion (along with irreversibility) helps to 
screen out less-relevant options.   
Repositioning in the strategy literature 
Repositioning costs receive prominent and diverse treatment in the literature addressing 
strategic change but much less so in the competitive dynamics of such changes. Our approach, 
which focuses on competitive dynamics at the grand strategy level, can be understood within the 
context of Porter’s “positioning school” of strategy (Porter, 1985, 1996). Within this school, a 
firm and its position are characterized by a set of activities the firm undertakes that collectively 
create value for the customer. These activities are parts of the value chain which may fall within 
traditional groupings (e.g., R&D, manufacturing, marketing) or across such groupings. Each 
firm’s position is also defined by the tradeoffs that the position entails. So, for example, one 
firm’s activity system being well-suited to deliver value to a particular customer segment is not 
so well-suited to serve a different customer segment. Because competitive advantage is enhanced 
when these activities are reinforcing, a firm’s competitive advantage comes, in part, from the 
ways in which the various activities relate to one another (Porter, 1996). This perspective of the 
activity system that is configured to best deliver value also maps very closely to the concept of 
“business models” (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010). 
From this perspective, strategic changes are major alterations to a firm’s activity system, 
which are understood in relation to the path through which the current and previous activity 
systems were reached (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Siggelkow, 2002). The more tightly 
integrated the activity system and the greater the change, the higher the costs of repositioning.  
Furthermore, significant changes in one’s position means that reverting to a previous position 
will be costly. Repositioning costs are, therefore, first-order features of major strategic changes. 
The literatures on organizational inertia (e.g., Barnett and Carroll, 1995; Christensen, 
1997; Hannan and Freeman 1977; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008) and cognitive inertia (Tripsas 
and Gavetti, 2000) emphasize the importance of repositioning costs. Organizational inertia can 
be so strong that organizations continue to reflect their original form despite major changes in 
their external environment (Stinchcombe 1965). Repositioning costs are also attributed to 
significant changes in the development of organizational capabilities and institutions (e.g., 
Selznick, 1949) and changes in routines (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982) and culture (e.g., 
Schein, 2010).    
The development of organizational capabilities deserves particular note. Although the 
development of a new capability need not directly detract from existing capabilities, the often 
tacit nature of these capabilities strongly suggests that developing a new capability may diminish 
one or more previously existing capabilities (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Levinthal and March, 
1993). By extension, a firm’s repositioning costs include not only the direct costs of changing its 
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tangible activities and choices, but also the more indirect costs that might be associated with 
changes/losses in existing capabilities that an old activity system created and sustained (e.g., 
King and Tucci, 2002; Tripsas, 1997). 
In summary, a significant consensus exists in the organizational and strategy literatures 
that major strategic change entails significant costs. Despite the recognized importance of these 
costs, they have not been a central focus of game-theoretic models developed to illuminate grand 
strategy questions. When repositioning costs are absent from models of strategic change, a 
serious question is raised regarding the robustness of such models.  
Commitment and inter-firm interaction in the economics and strategy literatures   
Commitment is a central concern of game-theoretic analyses in industrial organization 
economics. (See, e.g., Saloner, Shepard, and Podolny, 2000). Nevertheless, with the important 
exception of the value-based approaches based in cooperative game theory, the vast majority of 
this work applies to tactical and intermediate-level strategic interaction problems rather than to 
interactions involving grand strategy.4 One reason for the dearth of grand strategy analyses is 
that the richness that characterizes grand strategy cannot be easily captured in the precisely-
specified mechanisms favored by analytic modelers.  
While instructive in certain regards, the literature straddling the boundary between 
economics and strategy that applies game theory to specific strategic settings typically does not 
focus on changes in grand strategy. For example, Ghemawat (1997) uses game theory to discuss 
many business cases, while others have examined subjects such as dynamics between 
competitors (e.g. Esty and Ghemawat, 2002), competition between business models (Casadesus-
Masanell and Ghemawat, 2006), competing complements (Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie, 
2007), strategic interactions in multi-sided platforms (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Evans, Hagiu 
and Schmalensee, 2006), and time-compression diseconomies (Pacheco-de-Almeida and 
Zemsky, 2007). In some cases key strategic features of a competitive interaction are explored, 
but even then, strategic change is not the primary focus of the analysis. 
The economics and strategy literatures most salient to repositioning costs concern, 
respectively, the economics of switching costs and the modeling of implementation costs. The 
switching-cost literature in economics generally addresses either the implications of either buyer 
or supplier switching costs on the competitive interactions of focal firms or the switching costs 
incurred by focal firms when they change the actions that they take. While most attention has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Unlike most work from non-cooperative game theory, the value-based approach developed from 
cooperative game theory (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996) is directly applied to grand strategy. This 
research stream includes an elegant framework that integrates value creation, value capture and 
competition. The framework focuses on the bargaining power of the various actors and how that is 
crucially determined by the unique value they add to the system. While this approach is powerful, work in 
this line also does not focus on repositioning costs involved when firms in these games change their 
strategies. 
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focused on the former category, the later category, which includes dynamic game theory models 
(Lipman and Wang, 2000; Caruana and Einav, 2008) addressing the effect of switching costs in 
repeated games, are directly relevant to our inquiry.5 Lipman and Wang analyze a finite repeated 
game with switching costs with particular attention to how switching costs affect the equilibria of 
a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, while Caruana and Einav explore a model with endogenous 
timing of commitments where the cost of switching a commitment increases over time. These 
papers provide a start on the theoretical foundation for further explorations of the type we 
advocate. 
Exploration of the implications of implementation costs at the grand strategy level are 
very few. The best example of strategy-oriented work incorporating repositioning costs is 
Makadok and Ross (2013) who show how such costs endogenously lead to markets characterized 
by product differentiation. This important first foray explores repositioning costs in a static 
context which, hopefully, will soon be followed by strategy-oriented work exploring dynamic 
repositioning.6 Other relevant game-theoretic work on implementation costs, though not 
generally concerned with the dynamic interaction of grand strategies, include Pacheco-de-
Almeida and Zemsky (2007) and Chatain and Zemsky (2011).7 Pacheco-de-Almeida and 
Zemsky (2007) formalize the notion that “the faster a firm develops a resource, the greater the 
cost.”  While speed-based costs are similar to repositioning costs in many ways, the costs are not 
incurred when transitioning from one activity system to another (although it could be a part of 
it). Chatain and Zemsky (2011) formalize the “frictions” in industry value chains that prevent 
some transactions and, thereby, destroying potential value.  Friction costs too are important 
incurred costs, but they differ from repositioning costs discussed earlier, which are costs incurred 
when firms undertake strategic change. 
3. Repositioning costs: relevance and classes 
This paper focuses upon repositioning costs in contexts involving strategy dynamics.  
While repositioning costs increase realism in the analysis of competitive interactions, they are 
complicating factors.  Hence, it is valuable to consider conditions under which such costs truly 
impact strategic interactions. 
When do repositioning costs matter? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 A somewhat related literature examines the costs that buyers face when switching suppliers. Some of 
these models do not involve strategic interaction among the buyers, while other models, in considering 
strategic interaction, only examine the role these costs play in the decision of the focal firm to vertically 
integrate along its supply chain. 
6 Makadok and Ross’s model of product differentiation involves two firms that simultaneous choose their 
position, then, given the positions, simultaneously choose price. The model is static because it does not 
explore how positioning choices unfold over time.  
7 See also Chen and MacMillan (1992) which explicitly accounted for the fact that both “attackers” and 
“defenders” suffered “implementation costs” when they changed their strategic actions. Their approach is 
very much in the tradition of the industrial organization literature. 
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The first-order consideration is the size of the repositioning costs relative to that of the 
market payoffs.  Interaction settings can be ordered along this dimension. 8 At one extreme the 
focal party incurs extremely low, if any, repositioning costs. In this part of the repositioning cost 
spectrum, repositioning costs would not be expected to influence the outcomes of the 
interactions, e.g., price changes usually involve relatively small “repositioning” costs which are, 
therefore, secondary concerns in analyses of competitive pricing interactions. At the other 
extreme the parties involved incur extremely high repositioning costs relative to the market 
payoffs. Because any grand strategic change there is prohibitively expensive, no interesting 
grand strategic dynamic is present. These latter situations are consistent with the classical 
population ecology perspective as applied to strategy.9  
Repositioning costs are most critical for a strategic interactions falling within the middle 
of the delineated spectrum and for which the costs are of the same order of magnitude as the 
market payoffs. Such settings would involve, for example, changes and realignments of activity 
systems, or major changes to product lines or geographies served. Given the context-specific 
nature of repositioning costs, it is helpful to classify the various types of costs as a prelude to 
identifying and estimating them. 
Classes of repositioning costs 
We identify two nonexclusive bases for categorizing repositioning costs:  distance and 
history/time based costs.  
Distance-based repositioning costs depend on the properties of the focal firm’s “origin” 
(the initial activity system from which the firm is moving), “destination” (the system to which 
that the firm is moving), as well as the relationship between these two positions. The intuitive 
notion underlying this concept is that repositioning costs increase with the “distance” 
characterizing the strategic repositioning.  For example, repositioning costs could reflect the 
change in the set of resources and capabilities required to execute the origin versus destination 
activity systems. Such costs also account for difficulties in changing from the initial activity 
system of the firm (i.e., origin), for example, difficulties in unwinding and changing the current 
operations and related commitments. Such costs most directly map onto the classic 
considerations of commitment (e.g., capacity additions, long-term contracts) discussed earlier. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 What matters is the impact of a marginal change of a factor/variable on the outcome, not really the level. 
At both the left and right extremes, marginal changes in the repositioning cost do not cause significant 
changes in the outcomes of the strategic interactions.  
9 Within this context, competitive interactions would be more tactical, e.g., with the relevant repositioning 
cost deriving from commitments involving changes to elements of an activity system rather than changes 
to the activity system itself.	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From a modeling perspective, a distance-based repositioning cost function takes both the 
destination action as well as the origin action as its arguments. 10  
This notion of a change’s difficulty corresponding to its distance constitutes a central 
construct within many schools of thought within strategic management. Resources are less 
productive as their uses increasingly diverge from their core uses (Montgomery and Wernerfelt 
1988). Firms are argued to be much more effective at local search (e.g. identifying and 
developing improvements or innovations that are closely related to their current activities) than 
distant search (Nelson and Winter 1982), and organizational learning also tends to be very local 
and myopic (Levinthal and March 1993). Movements in the technological space are also argued 
to be increasingly difficult with distance (e.g. Stuart and Podolny, 1996).  
History-based and time-based repositioning costs more comprehensively reflect a 
firm’s prior history beyond its most immediate origin and the destination. This cost category, 
while relatively uncommon in game theoretic treatments, has strong antecedents in the strategic 
change literature. Sosa (2012), for example, argues for differential R&D productivity of firms 
based on their different “pre-histories.” Other examples include different learning mechanisms 
(Argyris and Schön, 1978; Levinthal and March, 1993; Nelson and Winter, 1982), absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1991) and core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). In general 
terms, a firm’s prior experiences alter the costs of changing its activity systems. As such, two 
firms with the same origin and destination activity systems (the same “distances”) may have 
different repositioning costs due to their different histories.  
From a modeling perspective, history-influenced repositioning cost functions take as their 
arguments, in addition to the destination and origin actions/states, actions of the firm prior to the 
previous period (e.g., accounting for a path-dependence of two or more periods). History-based 
repositioning costs are rarely accounted for in the payoffs in typical multi-period games, except 
when history can be summarized with a single statistic such as “experience.” Accounting for 
history-based repositioning costs requires that such costs be a function of the relevant history or 
a function of a set of history-related summary statistics. In a bimatrix game, for example, each 
payoff matrix would have payoffs that are contingent on each players’ historical choices. 
Time-based repositioning costs reflect the notion of a firm’s increasing inertia to change 
the longer it has occupied a given position. Costs within this category reflect multiple notions 
including the development and embeddedness of routines over time (Nelson and Winter, 1982), 
the exploitation and learning tend to increase competence for local actions while decreasing 
competence for distant search (Levinthal and March, 1993), the acquisition of position-specific 
resources and capabilities over time (Barney, 1991; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997), and the 
development of organizational relationships. In a time-based cost structure, the longer a firm has 
been executing a certain strategy, the higher its cost of repositioning. Another example of time-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Arguably, distance-based repositioning costs are implicitly embedded in the payoffs. It is often unclear, 
however, whether modelers developing such payoffs are taking repositioning costs into account. 
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based cost entails how speeding up a repositioning from the origin to the destination 
(compressing the move on the time dimension) increases the cost (Pacheco-de-Almeida and 
Zemsky, 2007). 
As one approaches the level of grand strategy, the precise mechanism that identifies 
commitment costs becomes harder to identify precisely. Nonetheless, managers should have a 
first-order sense of the structure of actual repositioning costs even without a full understanding 
of such costs. Identifying the precise mechanisms, though very helpful, is not always necessary 
for conducting a useful strategic interaction analysis at the grand-strategy level. A fruitful 
parallel path to better understand higher-level strategy dynamics, perhaps combining empirical 
and theoretical work, would be to explore general structures of repositioning costs. Marx and 
Hsu (2013) present an intriguing framework along these lines in which firms commercialize their 
technologies through a grand strategy that includes changes in positioning along with an 
awareness of the repositioning costs such changes entail. 
4.  A Time-Based Repositioning Cost Example  
This section explores some implications of time-based repositioning costs with a 
numerical example that captures key elements of a multiple-period interaction between an 
innovator and a follower. The innovator develops and introduces a new generation of product in 
each period and chooses to offer either generous or stingy licensing terms to a follower. The 
follower can either reject the license offered and imitate the innovation or it can accept the 
license and focus on being an effective complementor (or merely a producer rather than a 
developer of the underlying technology). One example of such an interaction involved Intel and 
IBM.  Intel developed successive generations of microprocessors and offered licenses to IBM 
which then licensed the technology and became a producer/complementor to Intel instead of 
developing its own microprocessors. Another example involved hybrid automobile engines 
where the innovator, Toyota, offered licenses of its hybrid technology to several of its 
competitors. Toyota constitutes the powertrain system innovator and the other auto companies 
are followers, i.e., potential licensees of the hybrid powertrain for use in their automobile 
models. Through its licensing practices, Toyota reduced the incentives of the licensees to imitate 
that generation of hybrid technology. 
The interaction is modeled as a three-period game. Each period consists of a sequence in 
which the innovator chooses which license to offer (generous or stingy) and then the follower 
chooses either to reject (by deciding to imitate the innovator’s technology) or to accept the 
licensing terms (and focus on developing complementary capabilities). Each player’s net payoff 
for each period consists of the market payoff for the player minus any repositioning costs 
incurred that period.  Per period market payoffs to these actions are provided in the table below. 
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  INNOVATOR 
  Generous Licensing Stingy Licensing 
    
FOLLOWER 
Imitate 1, 1 1, 1 
Complement 2.5, 0.5 0, 3 
 
When the follower chooses imitation, the payoffs do not vary by licensing choice because 
imitation implies the rejection of the license. Complement payoffs depend on license terms with 
generous licensing favoring the follower and stingy licensing favoring the innovator. The 
complement payoffs reflect the improved joint profits available to the two firms when they do 
not directly compete with each other and then split those joint profits depending on the licensing 
terms. All choices are observable by each player. 
Within this setting, only the follower’s choices involve repositioning costs 𝜅. No 
repositioning costs exist for the innovator because there is no change in its activity system 
between the two licensing options.11  A change in the follower’s choices may involve 
repositioning costs because the activity systems supporting imitation versus complementarity are 
different. Because it takes time to implement (commit to) a new activity system, commitment 
increases the longer a firm engages in the same activity system as does the cost of 
repositioning.12 Such time-based repositioning costs are modeled as being incurred only when 
changing from an option that had been chosen in both of the two previous periods. That means 
that repositioning costs only obtain in the third period, if at all. Because these costs depend on 
the history of choices, they are separate from the market payoffs given in the market payoff 
matrix.   
Each firm is assumed to exercise foresight and to maximize the undiscounted sum of the 
market payoffs minus repositioning costs over the three periods. As is standard in the analysis of 
noncooperative games, we look for Nash equilibrium strategies. Within this context, then, each 
firm’s grand strategy constitutes a best response to the other firm’s grand strategy. Given the 
structure of the game, solving the game through backward induction is straightforward. See the 
Appendix for a formal statement of the equilibrium strategies. 
Analysis and interpretation 
Consider a situation with no repositioning costs (𝜅 = 0). In that setting, the follower and 
innovator can each be assured of a payoff of at least 1 per period. The innovator’s challenge is 
how to make more profits. Unfortunately, whenever the innovator offers the stingy license, the 
follower responds with imitation, so the innovator only receives 1 per period. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The innovator’s choices would normally entail some strategic commitments in addition to licensing 
offers and, therefore, would also involve repositioning costs. This example eliminates that complexity.    
12 This example suppresses the possibility that the relative “distance” between activity systems affects the 
size of the repositioning costs. 
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Now assume there are repositioning costs such that 𝜅 >1. The innovator, through general 
licensing terms, can induce the follower to pursue complementarity in the first two periods. After 
two successive periods as a complementor, the follower incurs the repositioning cost if it 
switches to imitation. Therefore, in the third period, the innovator switches to stingy license and 
the follower remains with complement. Compared with the no repositioning cost setting, the 
innovator now receives 4 instead of 3, while the follower receives 5 instead of 3. 
The core intuition underlying this example is that time-based repositioning costs can 
induce the innovator to undertake early profit sacrifices to get its rival locked into the option 
(activity system) that it wants the rival to play. Crucially, this dynamic requires repositioning 
costs. Furthermore, it is optimal for each firm to make these choices, even when both correctly 
anticipate play.13   
This example illustrates the power of considering repositioning costs as part of strategic 
interaction. Repositioning costs change the dynamics of responses but, without the strategic 
interaction analysis, it is not evident how the dynamics operate and can be turned to strategic 
advantage. Numerous examples exist of firms that take advantage of lock-in associated with 
continued investment in an existing technology or user group. Yoffie and Kwak (2001) discusses 
how challenger firms take advantage of entrenched activity systems that prevent responses to 
their actions.  For example, Pepsi was able to attack Coca-Cola with a twelve ounce bottle 
because Coca-Cola had a network of bottlers that were invested in Coke’s original six and one 
half ounce bottles (Yoffie and Kwak 2001, p. 81) which increased the costs of a Coke response. 
Arguably strategists should recognize that the implementation of a rival’s repositioning takes 
time and, as such, waiting for the rival to solidify its new position so that additional repositioning 
would involve significant costs, can be turned to one’s advantage.14  Nonetheless, the full 
strategic insight developed in the innovator-follower example may remain unrecognized absent 
the discipline and guidance provided by modeling this strategic interaction using game theory.  
More generally, the strategic dynamics this model contains suggest some interesting 
forces that enhance differentiation in an industry. For example, one interpretation of the 
follower-innovator example is that repositioning dynamics facilitate strategies that increase 
differentiation amongst rivals in a market. In the example, the distribution of profits is inter-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The intuition emerging from this numerical example obtains with a wide range of payoff values. 
Consider a similarly structured game in which the innovator makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to the 
follower and the innovator has complete flexibility regarding the contracts it offers in each period. The 
attendant repositioning costs also lead to an equilibrium outcome in which the follower receives a larger 
share of its revenue in the first two periods and the innovator receives a larger share of its revenues in the 
final period. 
14 One example of strategic waiting allegedly occurred when Unocal represented to key parties that it 
“lacked, or would not assert, patent rights concerning automobile emissions research results” but then 
asserted such rights after standards were adopted that depended on Unocal’s intellectual property. In the 
Matter of Union Oil Company of California, FTC Docket no. 9305, 2005, p. 1.  
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temporal:  the follower (now complementor) is the initial beneficiary of the dynamic, while 
innovator benefits in the later periods.   
5.  Discussion 
This paper has focused on strategic interaction at the grand strategy level. For such 
interactions repositioning costs associated with strategic change are central. This section 
considers the endogeneity of repositioning costs and then discusses the robustness of the game-
theoretic approach for analyzing strategic interactions at the grand strategy level.  
Endogeneity of repositioning costs, dynamic capabilities, and activity systems 
Thus far we have treated repositioning costs as a function of choices that do not operate 
directly on the repositioning cost structure itself. Repositioning costs are dynamic constructs; 
they require a strategic change to come into play. It is, therefore, instructive to consider how 
other key dynamic constructs such as dynamic capabilities relate to the above analysis. Two 
promising areas of research that directly relate to repositioning cost structures concern dynamic 
capabilities (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Helfat 1997) and the alignment of activity systems 
(Porter, 1996). 
Dynamic capabilities involve “specific organizational and strategic processes (e.g., 
product innovation, strategic decision making, alliancing) by which managers alter their resource 
base.” (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000, pg. 1111). Such capabilities might be expected to affect 
repositioning costs, with greater capabilities generally lowering costs. Eisenhardt and Martin 
specifically focus on the features of best practices upon which firms converge to address 
environmental turbulence, and distinguish between the best practices in low-medium-velocity 
markets and high-velocity markets. 
One advantage that superior dynamic capabilities confer is that they allow organizations 
to more quickly perceive and then adapt to changes in the underlying market and technological 
environment (Teece, 2009). To the extent that dynamic capabilities change the level and 
characteristics of repositioning costs, our analysis suggests that acquiring such capabilities can 
affect the strategic interactions among competitors. Consider the prior example in which time-
based repositioning costs enabled both competitors to achieve payoffs higher than what would 
have obtained with lower repositioning costs that might, e.g., be faced by firms with greater 
dynamic capabilities. High repositioning costs makes follower “lock-in,” as a complementor, 
possible.  Thus, the attractiveness of a repositioning-cost-reducing dynamic capability depends in 
part on the strategic interactions in the situation under consideration. 
A second, related body of research examines the degree of alignment characterizing a 
firm’s various resources and activity systems. Tight alignment across firm resources and activity 
systems is generally viewed positively as leading to superior competitive advantage. It is 
conceivable, however, that tightly coupled systems will be difficult to change owing to high 
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repositioning costs.  As such, relatively more loosely aligned resources could be advantageous 
with regard to firm changes. Greater attention to repositioning costs could provide insights 
regarding the significance of alignment within different business environments.  Models 
incorporating repositioning costs might also illuminate the competitive consequences associated 
with generalist versus specialist organizations. For example, a model could investigate the 
tradeoffs between a more flexible activity system, which would presumably lower costs of 
repositioning to “closer” activity systems but for some variable cost penalty, and the costs of 
decreased specialization.    
Robustness of analyses 
A core argument of this paper is that repositioning costs should be a central feature of 
analyses of strategic dynamics at the grand strategy level. Despite a general recognition of the 
importance of repositioning costs in the literature, there have been very few systematic 
explorations of grand strategy interactions that incorporate such costs.15 Two potential 
explanations for the absence of work in this area are a bias towards more precise mechanisms 
which may lead researchers to focus on more tactical settings and a concern that the complexity 
of grand strategy reduces the value of assessing strategic interaction given the level of rationality 
and foresight that game-theoretic analyses typically demand.  
One view of the value of game-theoretic models for practice is that such models generate 
insights by providing logical discipline. The complexity of business competition is a two-edged 
sword in this regard. Complexity increases the value of imposing a logical analysis that forces 
strategists to ask sharper questions and to have tools to discard bad intuitive analyses. But 
complexity also increases the difficulty of creating models that sufficiently capture actual 
situations so as to be useful.  
With respect to the concern regarding rationality and foresight, the analysis of the 
innovator-follower is instructive.  That example, to be sure, depends on foresight and rationality, 
but the differentiation outcome does not require full foresight and rationality from both players. 
Only the innovator must exhibit foresight and rationality. Without foresight, the innovator will 
not understand that offering a “generous” license in the first two periods will allow it to get high 
profits in the third period by offering a “stingy” license. On the other hand, the follower need not 
exercise foresight. The follower can merely react to the innovator’s offer with its best myopic 
choice. The follower would choose “complement” in response to a generous license in the first 
two periods as well as in the third period in response to a stingy license. In the third period the 
repositioning cost prevents the follower from changing to an “imitate” choice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The literature has not ignored the fact that the performance of a firm depends on the actions of other 
actors. The notions of competitive advantage, competitive position, and valuable resources crucially 
depend on the other actors. But while acknowledging that the actions of the other actors impact the 
performance of the focal firm, most of the literature takes these outside factors as parameters in a decision 
problem, over which the strategist optimizes. 
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Finally, this example can be modified to illustrate a closely-related situation demanding 
greater foresight.  Consider a modification in which (a) the order of play within periods is 
reversed, such that the new first mover is the (old) follower (e.g., the decision to imitate or 
complement because it is a commitment, comes before the negotiation of license terms) and (b) 
the game continues for four periods instead of three.16 Once again, there is a differentiation 
outcome in which complement/generous licensing occurs early in the game and the 
complement/stingy licensing occurs late in the game. But, unlike in the original example, this 
outcome requires foresight on the part of both players. In the first period, a complement choice 
by the (new) leader could be met with a stingy license that would net the innovator a first-period 
payoff of 3. For the new leader’s differentiation ploy to be successful, the innovator needs to 
anticipate that responding with generous licensing terms for two periods generates a 
repositioning cost that will cause the new leader to continue to choose complement—and hence 
gives the innovator stingy-licensing profits in the last two periods. Otherwise, the new leader 
would optimally choose to imitate in the third period. This seems plausible given that timing 
moves to achieve lock-in is a known strategic weapon.  The more demanding foresight 
requirement falls to the new leader. That leader must recognize the opportunity as such and 
believe that the innovator will forgo the short-run payoff-maximizing stingy licensing response. 
An interesting aspect of this example is that the differentiation ploy is initiated by the player 
whose action is predicated on a subtle strategic interaction insight. If that player misses the 
insight, imitation rather than differentiation results.  
6.  Conclusion 
This paper argues that repositioning costs are fundamental features of strategic change 
and, therefore, should be accounted for in strategic interactions involving grand strategies. The 
inherent complexity of strategic considerations, however, renders difficult the identification of 
specific mechanisms by which grand strategy changes. We believe that a fruitful approach would 
be to focus on general repositioning cost structures (such as time-based structures) that can be 
identified from the organizational and strategy literatures. We hope that the classification and 
analysis of repositioning costs developed here is a first step in that direction. 
 
Appendix:  Formal statement of the equilibrium of the example 
The statement of the strategies depends on the follower’s historical choices and the 
innovator’s current period choices. History is designated in braces as appropriate. Choices are 
abbreviated G for generous licensing, S for stingy licensing, I for imitate, and C for complement. 
The number of letters in the braces also indicates the period. Thus, e.g., {CC} indicates it is 
period three and that the “Complement” was played in periods one and two. In addition, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This latter change is needed to increase the value of the differentiation strategy to the innovator. We 
chose a three-period example to minimize the complexity. 
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equilibrium strategies for the example vary depending on the size of the repositioning cost κ. It is 
easy to confirm that the above strategies are equilibria either by checking deviations or by using 
backward induction to solve the relevant strategic interactions. 
For 0 ≤ κ < 1, Innovator equilibrium strategy:  S always; Follower equilibrium 
strategy:  If G, then C; If S, then I  (in all periods). 
 
For 1 ≤ κ ≤ 1.5, Innovator equilibrium strategy:  Given {}, G;  given {I} then S, given 
{C} then G; given {II}, {CC}, {IC}, or {CI}, then S. Follower equilibrium strategy:  Given 
{}, {I}, or {C}, if G then C, if S then I; given {II}, {CC}, {IC}, or {CI}, if G then C;  given {II}, 
{IC}, or {CI}, if S then I;  given {CC}, if S then C.  
 
For 1.5 < κ , the equilibrium outcomes are the same as for 1 ≤ κ < 1.5, but there is a slight 
difference where for the follower, given {II}, if G then I. 
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